NOTES

The Waiver of Tribal Sovereign

Immunity in the Contractual
Context: Conffict Between the Ninth
Circuit and the Alaska
Supreme Court?*
This note considers the waiver of Alaskan Native governments'
sovereign immunity status through arbitrationclauses and similar
contractualprovisions. While avoiding the larger debate over
whether Native Alaskan communities constitute sovereign entities,
the Alaska Supreme Court has expanded on a 1981 Ninth Circuit
holding to find, in a series of cases, that Native groups, through
ambiguous contractualclauses, have waived any claim to sovereign immunity. This note argues that these rulings are contrary
to Ninth Circuit (and, arguably, United States Supreme Court)
holdings that a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity must be
express and unequivocal. In addition, this note provides suggestions to practitioners,representingNative and non-Native groups,
for negotiatingthe perils of the sovereign immunity doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade, the Alaska Supreme Court has seriously
eroded the potential protection provided to Native groups by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is well established that Indian
tribes, like other governmental entities, enjoy the protection of
sovereign immunity until it is waived.' The United States Supreme
Court has held that in order for such a waiver to be effective, it
""'cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.""' '2 In
the 1981 case of United States v. Oregon,3 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that an Indian tribe had effectively waived its
immunity both by voluntarily intervening in a proceeding before the
federal district court and by signing a consent decree that explicitly
granted the district court jurisdiction over disputes resulting from
that agreement.4 The Alaska Supreme Court has extended the
Oregon holding through a series of cases' in which it has held that
various contractual clauses resulted in waiver of a Native group's
claim to immunity. These holdings have come despite seeming
disapproval by the Ninth Circuit6 and criticism from commentators.7 Assuming arguendo that Alaskan Native groups are entitled
to sovereign status, these Alaska Supreme Court rulings undermine
congressional policy and frustrate efficient operation of the
commercial market.
This note details the history of this questionable line of cases
and provides recommendations for practitioners concerned with
transactions involving Native groups. Part II provides an explana1. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S.
505, 510 (1991); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); Puyallup
Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172 (1977); United States v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940) (citing Turner v.
United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919)).
2. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424
U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969))).
3. 657 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1981).
4. Id at 1014.
5. Nenana Fuel Co. v. Native Village of Venetie, 834 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1992);
Hydaburg Coop. Ass'n v. Hydaburg Fisheries, 826 P.2d 751 (Alaska 1992); Native
Village of Eyak v. GC Contractors, 658 P.2d 756 (Alaska 1983).
6. See Pan Am. Co. v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians, 884 F.2d 416,419 (9th
Cir. 1989).
7. ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 341 (3d ed. 1991)
("In Native Village of Eyak v. GC Contractors, ... the Alaska Supreme Court
found a waiver on rather dubious grounds, as being implicit in a contractual
provision submitting disputes to arbitration.") (citing Eyak, 658 P.2d at 756).
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tion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, its roots and its application to Indian tribes. In order to provide the necessary background for understanding modem Native organizations, part III
details the distinction between governmental and corporate entities,
as established by two key provisions of the Indian Reorganization
Act ("IRA"),8 with particular emphasis on the Alaska Supreme
Court's interpretive analysis in Atkinson v. Haldane.9 Part IV
discusses the apparent divergence between the Ninth Circuit and
Alaska Supreme Court cases. Part V concludes that the Ninth
Circuit has taken the better reasoned of the two positions, and
argues that the Alaska Supreme Court's analysis undermines
congressional policy goals and, through potential frustration of the
intent of the contracting parties, interferes with market operations.
Finally, part VI provides suggestions for both Native entities and
other interested parties for dealing with the hazards of the sovereign
immunity doctrine in the contractual context.
II.

THE DoCrRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND ITS ROOTS

Sovereignty, the concept that a group of individuals enjoys an
inherent right to self-government," flows from natural law.
Sixteenth century Spanish scholar Francisco de Vitoria advanced the
view "that certain basic rights inhere in men as men, not by reason
of their race, creed, or color, but by reason of their humanity.""

Vitoria also offered one of the first articulations of the principle of
tribal self-government in observing "'a certain method in their

affairs, for they have polities which are orderly arranged and they
have definite marriage

and magistrates, overlords, laws,

and

workshops, and a system of exchange, all of which call for the use
of reason; they also have a kind of religion.""' 2 A more poignant
modem-day formulation was provided by an Alaska Native who
explained:

8. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, §§ 1-19, 48 Stat. 984 (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991)) (also known as the
Wheeler-Howard Act).
9. 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977).
10. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 66 (2d ed. 1988).
11. Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the
United States, 31 GEo. LJ. 1, 11-12 (1942).
12. Id. at 13 (quoting VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE JuRE BELLI REFLECrlONES
§ 1, para. 23 (Nys' ed. 1917)).
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[B]ecause we don't
"[W]e call ourselves a sovereign people ....
have to ask anybody, we going to hunt on our land or to get
timber to build our cabins. We go out and do it without any
waste, and we have our own laws that follow, that's been in
existence before the White man law came into the village, came
into the
country. And we still follow that. That's a traditional
13
law.

Vitoria's ideas indirectly influenced the federal government's
interaction with Indians. Noted Indian scholar Felix Cohen argued
that both the United States and Britain adopted Vitoria's notions in
order to appeal to the Indians, who initially represented a powerful
military force in the New World.14 Spain offered respect for tribal
autonomy and security for Indian lands, and to compete for the
favor of the Natives (and their military power), the United States
and Britain followed suit.' The Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
which predates the United States Constitution by two years, also
reflects Vitoria's notions.'6 The Constitution itself bears the
imprimatur of notions of tribal independence, as the Indian
Commerce Clause' "recognizes ...exclusive federal authority in
...Indian affairs and categorizes tribes with other sovereigns for

[commerce purposes]."'"
Although the United States Supreme Court did not directly cite
Vitoria in any of its early opinions, it did utilize the ideas of other
scholars who drew upon his works.' In three seminal Indian Law
cases,' Chief Justice John Marshall etched into American jurisprudence the "core doctrines of aboriginal title, the dependent status of

13. THOMAS R. BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY: THE REPORT OF THE ALASKA
NATIVE REVIEW COMMISSION 142 (1985) (quoting Larry Williams of the Native

Village of Venetie).
14. Cohen, supra note 11, at 20.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 12.
17. This clause forms part of the general Commerce Clause, through which
Congress has the power "[tio regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3
(emphasis added).
18. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 232 (Rennard
Strickland et al. eds., 1982 ed.).
19. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 17; Blythe W. Marston, Alaska Native
Sovereignty: The Limits of the Tribe-Indian Country Test, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
375, 376 n.17 (1984).
20. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
(1823).
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Native tribes, and the inherent sovereignty of those tribes subject
only to the control of the federal government."'

More specifically,

the opinions resulted in a tribal relationship to the United States
that "resembles that of a ward to his guardian."'

That relation-

ship, however, "did not abolish preexisting tribal powers or make
the tribes ... dependent upon federal law for their powers of selfgovernment."' Rather, powers of tribal self-government could be
curtailed only by federal statutes, treaties with the federal government or restraints inherent in the relationship of the United States
to the tribes as their protector.24 Although these opinions have
been altered over time, they remain the foundation for ascertaining
the governmental status of tribes.'
Because tribal governments possess every inherent self-

government power that has not been expressly extinguished, tribal
powers cannot be described by reference to specific legislation.26
Nevertheless, over time, federal law has recognized certain fundamental powers of tribal self-government: power to establish a form
of government, power to determine membership, police power,

power to administer justice, power to exclude persons from the
reservation,
power to charter business organizations and sovereign
2
. 27
immu~llnity.

This note focuses on the last item, sovereign immunity. This
doctrine "'is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized
nations that the sovereign cannot be sued ... without its consent
and permission."'"
Sovereign immunity "is an amalgam of two

21.
COLO.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Eric Smith & Mary Kancewick, The Tribal Status of Alaska Natives, 61 U.
L. REV. 455, 475 (1990).
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
COHEN, supra note 18, at 233-34.
Id. at 235.
CANBY, supra note 10, at 68-69.
AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., INDIAN TRIBES

36 (1988) [hereinafter INDIAN TRIBES].
27. Id. at 36-39.
28. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 437 (1978) (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61
U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857)) (Rhenquist, J., dissenting). The majority of the
Court, however, required that "a claim of immunity in another sovereign's courts
... necessarily implicates the power and authority of a second sovereign; its source
must be found in an agreement, express or implied, between the two sovereigns, or
in the voluntary decision of the second to respect the dignity of the first as a matter
of comity." Id. at 416. While the underlying theoretical basis for tribal sovereign
immunity in federal and state courts is not clear, see infra text accompanying notes
38-39, the United States Supreme Court has held that it is established that "[s]uits
AS SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS

368

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:2

quite different concepts, one applicable to suits in the sovereign's
own courts and the other to suits in the courts of another sover' 29
eign.

The first portion of this amalgam developed from the structure
of the feudal system and the notion that "the King can do no
wrong."3 Adthough the United States Supreme Court has rejected
this legal fiction,3' policy considerations of protection of the public
fisc have replaced this original rationale3 2 and have led to the

doctrine's continuing viability.33
The second part of the amalgam, the bar to suits in the courts
of another sovereign, originates in international law.'
Two

against tribes are ... barred by sovereign immunity absent waiver by the tribe or
congressional abrogation." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991). Therefore, the Court acknowledges that
Congress, through inaction, is consenting to the tribes' use of this doctrine.
29. Id at 414.
30. Id at 414-15; see also 3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE § 71 (1959)
(discussing both the origins of sovereignty in the feudal system and the notion of
legal unaccountability that corresponds with the notion that "the King can do no
wrong").
31. Nevada, 440 U.S. at 415.
32. Thomas P. McLish, Note, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Searching for
Sensible Limits, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 173, 174 (1988); see also CLINTON et al., supra
note 7, at 337.
33.
Though the notion of sovereign immunity might seem best suited to a
government of royal power, the doctrine was nevertheless accepted by
American judges in the early days of the republic, and the law of the
United States has ever since been that, except to the extent the government consents to suit, it is immune.
W. PAGE KEEToN ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131,
at 1033 (5th ed. 1984); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 8 cmt. c
(1981) ("Contracts with a government or governmental agency are sometimes
unenforceable under remnants of the historic English tradition that the sovereign
is immune from suit.").
34. Native American groups hold a peculiar position in international law.
Indian tribes "are subordinate and dependent nations, possessed of all powers as
such .... However, they never have constituted 'nations' as that word is used by
writers on international law.... ." 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indians § 6 (1968).
One commentator offers the following observations on the early Indian law
opinions authored by Chief Justice John Marshall:
[They] would lead future courts to struggle with the paradoxical characterization of the relationship between the tribes and the United States as one
of independentdependence. With such a confused theoretical background,
it is little wonder that the supportive role which international law once
played in preserving the doctrine of tribal sovereignty was gradually
undermined as later courts hopelessly entangled themselves in the
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rationales support the assertion of immunity in this context. On a
metaphysical plane, international law deems sovereigns legally equal.
Therefore, one sovereign cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of

another.'- On a more practical level, comity dictates that a
sovereign acts in its own best interests if it prevents its courts from
thereby
entertaining an action brought against another sovereign,
36
avoiding international friction and later suits upon itself
The doctrine of sovereign immunity holds critical implications
for entities interacting with Native groups. Unless waived, governmental immunity may bar the enforcement of any contract against
the tribal entity.37
The precise theoretical foundation for tribal sovereign immunity
in American jurisprudence remains unclear. One philosophy asserts
that the doctrine's application to tribes stems from the groups' status
as sovereign entities.3 A competing theory suggests that tribes

enjoy the protection of sovereign immunity only by virtue of their
other words, the tribe
unique relationship with the United States; 3in
9
shares the federal government's immunity.
Whatever its metaphysical grounding, courts have extended the

doctrine to tribes not only for these reasons, but also because:
[S]overeign immunity is intended to protect what assets the
Indians still possess from loss through litigation. "That has been
the settled doctrine of the government from the beginning. If
any other course were adopted, the tribes would soon be
overwhelmed with civil litigation and judgments." If tribal assets
could be dissipated by litigation, the efforts of the United States
to provide the tribes with economic and political autonomy
could be frustrated. 4

contradictory ramifications of precedent.
Dario F. Robertson, Note, A New ConstitutionalApproach to the Doctrineof Tribal
Sovereignty, 6 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 371, 382 (1978). The same commentator
concludes that "it would appear that tribal sovereignty can no longer be vigorously
defended as a doctrine owing its present validity to the law of nations." Id. at 385.
35. McLish, supra note 32, at 176.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Pan Am. Co. v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians, 884 F.2d 416,419
(9th Cir. 1989) (holding that an arbitration clause failed to waive the tribe's
sovereign immunity, even though this result left plaintiff without an enforceable
remedy for the tribe's breach of contract).
38. See CLINTON et al., supra note 7, at 341.
39. Id
40. Cogo v. Central Council of the Tlingit & Haida Indians, 465 F. Supp. 1286,
1288 (D. Alaska 1979) (citations omitted) (quoting Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 304,
308-09 (8th Cir. 1908)).
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It is this economic justification that the courts4 and commentators42 find particularly persuasive today.
In was in the 1940 case of United States v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co.4' that the United States Supreme Court first
unequivocally stated that Indian tribes enjoy protection of sovereign
immunity until it is relinquished.' The Court has since reaffirmed
this holding numerous times,45 with its support evident as recently

as 1991 in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe.4
A waiver of sovereign immunity can be made by either
Congress47 or the tribe itself'4 But given the importance of the
policy considerations underlying the doctrine, federal courts have
hesitated to find an effective waiver. "It is settled that a waiver of

41. Cf.Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498
U.S. 505, 510 (1991) (refusing to modify the long-standing principle of tribal
sovereign immunity because of congressional legislation that "reflectfs] a desire to
promote the 'goal of Indian self-government, including its "overriding goal" of
encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development') (quoting California
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202,216 (1987) (quoting New Mexico
v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 35 (1983))).
42. Note, In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1058,

1073 (1982); see also

INDiAN TRIBES,

supra note 26, at 60 ("The extent to which

tribes can utilize their land and other natural resources to achieve steady economic
growth while preserving reservation environments will be a central determinant in
the kind of societies that will exist in Indian Country in the decades to come.").
43. 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
44. The Court stated that "[t]hese Indian Nations are exempt from suit without
Congressional authorization. It is as though the immunity which was theirs as
sovereigns passed to the United States for their benefit, as their tribal properties
did." Id.at 512 (footnote omitted).
45. E.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); Puyallup
Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172 (1977).
46. 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991).
47. Id.; Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56.
48. The United States Supreme Court appears to have ruled, although by
implication only, that a tribe may waive its sovereign immunity without federal
approval. In Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977), the
Court took pains to establish that neither Congress nor the tribe had waived the
tribe's immunity. ladat 172-73. Similarly, the Court recently stated that "[s]uits
against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver
by the tribe or Congressional abrogation." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at
509 (emphasis added). Federal appellate courts, however, have explicitly held that
a tribe may waive its immunity. United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1016 (9th
Cir. 1981); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1980),
affid on other grounds, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
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sovereign immunity 'cannot be implied but must be unequivocally
expressed.""' 49 The United States Supreme Court has stated that
when ambiguity exists in a statute alleged to waive sovereign
immunity, a court must resolve any ambiguities in favor of the
Indians.' Similarly, in considering a tribe's waiver of sovereign
immunity, federal appellate courts have held that the consent must
be strictly construed and applied.5 '
Although this note assumes for the purpose of argument that
Native Alaskan groups have sovereign immunity, uncertainty
surrounds this point. A marked schism divides the Ninth Circuit
and Alaska courts on the issue of whether Native Alaskan organizations even qualify as aboriginal groups that enjoy sovereign status.
The federal court has been more willing to recognize the sovereign
status of Native Alaskan groups, while the Alaska Supreme Court
has been recalcitrant.52
When faced with a defense of sovereign immunity, the Alaska
Supreme Court has sidestepped the ultimate question of whether
Native Alaskan groups constitute sovereigns. In assuming, without

49. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424
U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969))).
50. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (citing Alaska Pac.
Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918)).
51. Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe of the Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d
315, 320 (10th Cir. 1982); Namekagon Dev. Co. v. Bois Forte Reservation Hous.
Auth., 517 F.2d 508, 509 (8th Cir. 1975).
52. For a detailed discussion of the division between the courts and the
potential entitlement of Native Alaskan groups to sovereign status, see Native
Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991); Nenana
Fuel Co. v. Native Village of Venetie, 834 P.2d 1229, 1234-43 (Alaska 1992)
(Moore, J., concurring); Lloyd B. Miller, Caught in a Crossfire: The Conflict in the
Courts,Alaska Tribes in the Balance,in 1989 HARVARD INDIAN LAW SYMPOSIUM
135; Smith & Kancewick, supra note 21.
The Clinton Administration, via the Department of the Interior, recently
has given broad recognition to Native Alaskan groups as sovereigns. See Susanne
Di Pietro, Foreword to Native Law Selections: Recent Developments in Federal
Indian Law as Applied to Native Alaskans, 10 ALASKA LAW REVIEW 333, 334
(1993). This development may persuade both the federal and state courts to
interpret applicable federal statutes in favor of Native Alaskan groups in many
sovereignty claims. See United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 419 (1866)
(holding that when the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs have recognized a tribe's sovereign status, "it is the rule of this court to
follow the action of the executive. . ., whose more special duty it is to determine
such affairs. If by them those Indians are recognized as a tribe, this court must do
the same."); COHEN, supra note 18, at 3-5.
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deciding, that the groups appearing before it qualified as sovereigns,
the court has found that any claim to immunity had been voluntarily
waived by the tribes in the particular circumstances of the cases
reviewed. These holdings arise in situations that do not appear to
meet the United States Supreme Court's enunciated standard in
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,5 3 "that a waiver of sovereign
be implied but must be unequivocally eximmunity,,,,"'cannot
54
pressed.
III. THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACr-EXPLAINING THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN SECTION 16 AND 17 ENTITmS
Knowledge of the history and legislative motivation behind the
passage of the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act" ("IRA") is important to understanding waiver of tribal sovereign immunity in the
modem context for two reasons. First, many of the cases since 1934
involving the doctrine have centered on this legislation's provisions. 6 Second, consideration of Congress's reasoning in developing the IRA's provisions reveals policy concerns that serve as a
foundation for the application of the sovereign immunity doctrine
to Native organizations.
A. Background of the Indian Reorganization Act
The IRA, adopted in the first Congress of the Franklin Delano
Roosevelt Administration, has been called "the most successful
single example of Indian legislation. 5 1 The Act represented a
dramatic shift in federal policy toward Native Americans. It
assumed that Indian tribes should exist for an indefinite period.
This new movement starkly contrasted with the immediately
53. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
54. Id. at 58 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392,399 (1976) (quoting
United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969))). Santa Clara Pueblo applied the
quoted language, which had earlier been used in the general context of a waiver of

governmental immunity, to the sovereign immunity claim of an Indian tribe. One
commentator has observed that this case "put teeth into the doctrine of sovereign
immunity" in the Native law context. CLINTON et al., supra note 7, at 395.

55. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, §§ 1-19, 48 Stat. 984 (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1988 & Supp. 1 1991)) (also known as the
Wheeler-Howard Act). For a brief summary of the most significant provisions of
this Act, see COHEN, supra note 18, at 148-49.

56. See COHEN, supra note 18, at 325.
57. Alvin J. Ziontz, In Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Judicial

Errorin Construction of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 20 S.D. L. REV. 1, 56 (1975).
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preceding Allotment period, 8 "'which, in Theodore Roosevelt's
words, was intended to "break up the tribal mass" by taking lands
out of tribal control, thereby destroying the effectiveness of tribal
government."' 5 9 More specifically, the IRA represented part of
Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier's desire "to encourage
[tribal] economic development, self-determination, cultural plurality,
and the revival of tribalism."' Thus, the legislation would serve
as a mechanism for the tribe to "interact with and adapt to a
modern society, rather than force the assimilation of individual
Indians."'"
However, the intent behind IRA application to Alaska was
more limited, since Natives there had not suffered the loss of land
and intentional destruction of tribal governments that tribes in the
lower forty-eight states experienced; in Alaska, Congress intended
the legislation to act primarily as "a means of providing educational
and economic development assistance." 62 By the early 1970's,
seventy-one Alaskan communities had organized under the IRA.6
B. The Atkinson Opinion
In Atkinson v. Haldane,' the Alaska Supreme Court was
asked to interpret the crucial IRA provisions that promoted the
underlying policy objective of economic development. The Atkinson
court provided a guidepost'5 for distinguishing, for purposes of the
waiver of sovereign immunity, between the entities described in
section 16' and section 1767 of the Act. In doing so, the court

58. COHEN, supra note 18, at 127-43.
59. DAVID S. CASE, ALASKA NATIvES AND AMERICAN LAWS 444-45 n.75
(1984) (quoting S.L. TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLIcY 104 (1973) (quoting
Theodore Roosevelt, Message to Congress (Dec. 8, 1901))).
60. COHEN, supra note 18, at 147 (footnote omitted).
61. Id.
62. Miller, supra note 52, at 136.
63. CASE, supra note 59, at 436.
64. 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977).
65. The premier treatise on Federal Indian law recognizes Atkinson as the
"most thorough analysis" of the distinction between § 16 and § 17 entities. COHEN,
supra note 18, at 326 n.380.
66. Indian tribes are permitted to organize and adopt a constitution under § 16
of the IRA, which provides:
Organization of Indian tribes; constitution and bylaws and amendment
thereof; special election

(a) Adoption; effective date
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Any Indian tribe shall have the right to organize for its
common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution
and bylaws, and any amendments thereto, which shall become
effective when(1) ratified by a majority vote of the adult members of the
tribe or tribes at a special election authorized and called by
the Secretary under such rules and regulations as the Secretary
may prescribe; and
(2) approved by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (d) of
this section.
(b) Revocation
Any constitution or bylaws ratified and approved by the
Secretary shall be revocable by an election open to the same
voters and conducted in the same manner as provided in
subsection (a) of this section for the adoption of a constitution
or bylaws.
(c) Election procedure; technical assistance; review of proposals; notification of contrary-to-applicable law findings
(1) The Secretary shall call and hold an election as required by
subsection (a) of this section(A) within one hundred and eighty days after the receipt of a
tribal request for an election to ratify a proposed constitution
and bylaws, or to revoke such constitution and bylaws; or
(B) within ninety days after receipt of a tribal request for
election to ratify an amendment to the constitution and
bylaws.
(2) During the time periods established by paragraph (1), the
Secretary shall(A) provide such technical advice and assistance as may be
requested by the tribe or as the Secretary determines may be
needed; and
(B) review the final draft of the constitution and bylaws, or
amendments thereto to determine if any provision therein is
contrary to applicable laws.
(3) After the review provided in paragraph (2) and at least
thirty days prior to the calling of the election, the Secretary
shall notify the tribe, in writing, whether and in what manner
the Secretary has found the proposed constitution and bylaws
or amendments thereto to be contrary to applicable laws.
(d) Approval or disapproval by Secretary; enforcement
(1) If an election called under subsection (a) of this section
results in the adoption by the tribe of the proposed constitution and bylaws or amendments thereto, the Secretary shall
approve the constitution and bylaws or amendments thereto
within forty-five days after the election unless the Secretary
finds that the proposed constitution and bylaws or any
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also helped to illuminate Congress's purposes for making the
distinction.
The Atkinson court assisted in formulating the understanding
that Congress intended two conceptually separate entities to exist
via sections 16 and 17, respectively. Congress designed the sections
to operate in conjunction to permit tribes to enter into and compete
in the private business world, while simultaneously protecting the
tribal asset base by exposing only a limited amount of it to money
judgements.' Section 16 permits a tribe to adopt a constitution in
order to form a governmental body that exercises its preexisting
amendments are contrary to applicable laws.
(2) If the Secretary does not approve or disapprove the
constitution and bylaws or amendments within the forty-five
days, the Secretary's approval shall be considered as given.
Actions to enforce the provisions of this section may be
brought in the appropriate Federal district court.
(e) Vested rights and powers; advisement of presubmitted budget estimates
In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal
council by existing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe
shall also vest in such tribe or its tribal council the following
rights and powers: To employ legal counsel, the choice of
counsel and fixing of fees to be subject to the approval of the
Secretary; to prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets
without the consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with the
Federal, State, and local governments. The Secretary shall
advise such tribe or its tribal council of all appropriation
estimates or Federal projects for the benefit of the tribe prior
to the submission of such estimates to the Office of Management and Budget and the Congress.
25 U.S.C. § 476 (1988).
67. Specifically, § 17 provides:
Incorporation of Indian tribes; charter; ratification by election
The Secretary of the Interior may, upon petition by any tribe, issue a
charter of incorporation to such tribe: Provided, That such charter shall not
become operative until ratified by the governing body of such tribe. Such
charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the power to purchase, take
by gift, or bequest, or otherwise, own, hold, manage, operate, and dispose
of property of every description, real and personal, including the power to
purchase restricted Indian lands and to issue in exchange therefor interests
in corporate property, and such further powers as may be incidental to the
conduct of corporate business, not inconsistent with law, but no authority
shall be granted to sell, mortgage, or lease for a period exceeding
twenty-five years any trust or restricted lands included in the limits of the
reservation. Any charter so issued shall not be revoked or surrendered
except by Act of Congress.

Id. § 477 (Supp. 1 1991).
68. COHEN, supra note 18, at 325-26.
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powers of self-government.69 Therefore, by organizing under the

IRA, a Native community does not appear to relinquish any powers
of self-government that it may enjoy," including the protection of
sovereign immunity.
To be competitive in the private sector, Native community
business ventures require section 17, which permits a tribe to form
a corporate entity.7 ' Assuming that a Native group has sovereign
status, then, absent a sufficiently express and clear waiver, the
corporate entity would be entitled to the protection of sovereign
immunity.72 Because such protection would prevent a creditor
from reaching tribal assets in a breach of contract action, without
more, Native entities would have difficulty in obtaining credit, and,
therefore, competing in the marketplace. Section 17 remedies this
deficiency by permitting the governmental entity to pledge a portion
of the tribal assets to the separate corporate entity; the corporate
entity can then make these assets available as security for transactions by executing a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that
applies only to that corporate entity.73 The rest of the tribal assets
69. Id. at 326.
70. CASE, supra note 59, at 375. While the courts are divided on whether
Native groups in Alaska are entitled to sovereign status, see supra note 52,
communities organized under § 16 of the IRA seem to be "'recognized' as eligible
for federal Native programs and services." CASE, supra note 59, at 375.
71. One observer has commented that "[t]he corporate form of organization
lends itself to use in tribal development, since it is 'tribal' in its very nature.
Incorporation creates a cognizable legal entity around which to focus community
goals .... ." Note, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian ReorganizationAct of
1934, 70 MIcH. L. REV. 955, 982 (1972).
It is not unreasonable to suggest therefore that the Indians' long history of
tribalism as a way of life makes corporate organization a particularly
appropriate means of modem economic development.... It is also very
possible that continued use of corporate organization will facilitate a
greater cross-cultural understanding in our society.
Id. at 986; see also VINE, DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN
INDIAN MANIFESTO 227-28 (1969) ("In the corporate structure, formal and
informal, Indian tribalism has its greatest parallels[,] and it is through this means
that Indians believe that modem society and Indian tribes will finally reach a
cultural truce.").
72. See Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Community, 451 F. Supp. 1127,
1136 (D. Alaska 1978) ("[T]he corporation has 'the possibility for waiver of
[sovereign] immunity."' (quoting Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151,174-75 (Alaska
1977) (emphasis added))).
73. "It is clear and apparently undisputed that the mere fact of corporate
activity or existence does not waive the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the
community [i.e., corporation]." Id. However, one observer has argued:
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remain in the possession of the section 16 governmental entity,
shielded from judgment by sovereign immunity.
Prior to Atkinson, no judicial opinion had thoroughly examined
the distinction between the two entities.74 Later, in light of
Atkinson,75 one federal court remarked that both the United States
Supreme Court76 and the country's preeminent scholar on Indian
Law' had previously misinterpreted the separate nature of the two
entities.
Atkinson itself involved a suit against the Metlakatla Indian
Community for the wrongful death of two individuals, which
resulted from an automobile accident that community-employed
police officers allegedly caused by the negligent operation of a
police vehicle.7" After concluding that the specific history of the
tribe involved did entitle it to sovereign status,79 the court found
no waiver of sovereign immunity either by congressional legislation
or by the tribe itself.8" Specifically, in examining the purported
tribal waiver, the court made its crucial holding that Congress
intended that two separate entities would exist under section 16 and
section 17 of the IRA."'

The section 16 entity represented a

governmental unit, while the section 17 entity embodied a corporate
organization.' The distinction was critical because the court held
that a provision in the section 17 corporate charter, a "sue and be
sued" clause, represented a potential waiver that would solely
pertain to the section 17 corporate body.' Because the alleged
negligence involved only the section 16 governmental entity,
Just as an explicit waiver of the immunity by a section 17 corporation is
permitted because parties might otherwise hesitate to deal with tribal
businesses, an implied waiver [by the mere commercial activity of the
corporate entity] may also help tribal businesses to compete effectively in
the non-Indian business world and may further the federal goal of
encouraging tribal economic development.
Note, supra note 42, at 1074 (citations omitted).
74. See ParkerDrilling,451 F. Supp. at 1132-33.
75. Id. at 1135.
76. Id. at 1133 (citing Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45, 49

n.7 (1962)).
77. Id. at 1133 n.8 (citing FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAw 279 (2d prtg. 1942)).
78. Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 152 (Alaska 1977).
79. hM at 156.
80. 1& at 175.
81. IL at 174.
82. 1& at 174-75.
83. Id. at 175.
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sovereign immunity protected the community's assets, as opposed to
the corporation's assets, from judgment.'
The Atkinson court's reasoning rested on three sources: several
opinions of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior,' the
legislative history of the IRA, and considerations of public
policyY The court summarized and quoted three opinions of the
Solicitor with little additional discussion, remarking only that one of
the opinions "was most relevant to the issue at bar."'
In that
opinion, the Solicitor concluded:
"The purpose of Congress in enacting section 16 of the Indian
Reorganization Act was to facilitate and to stabilize the tribal
organization of Indians residing on the same reservation, for
their common welfare. It provided their political organization.
The purpose of Congress in enacting section 17 of the Indian
Reorganization Act was to empower the Secretary to issue a
charter of business incorporation to such tribes to enable them
to conduct business through this modem device, which charter
cannot be revoked or surrendered except by act of Congress.
This corporation, although composed of the same members as
the political body, is to be a separate entity, and thus more
capable of obtaining credit and otherwise expediting the business
of the tribe, while removing the possibility of federal liability for
activities of that nature. As a result, the powers, privileges and
89
responsibilitiesof these tribal organizationsmaterially differ.
In the second part of its analysis, an examination of the
legislative history referred to by the Solicitor, the court noted that
the original proposed legislation provided for only one type of tribal
entity.' However, because businesses would hesitate to deal with
or extend credit to tribes who could avoid liability through assertion
of sovereign immunity, the bill was redrafted to provide for two
entities. 1 Making a distinct division would more clearly meet the

84. The court also ruled that the purchase of an insurance policy did not
constitute a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity. Id. at 169.
85. Id. at 171 (citing Opinions of the Solicitor, Dep't of the Interior, Nos. M36,515 (Nov. 20, 1958), M-36,545 (Dec. 16, 1958), and M-36,119 (Feb. 14, 1952)).
86. Id. at 172-73 (citing S. REP. No. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)).
87. Id. at 174.
88. Id. at 172 (citing Opinions of the Solicitor, Dep't of the Interior, No. M36,515 (Nov. 20, 1958)).
89. Id. (quoting Opinions of the Solicitor, Dep't of the Interior, No. M-36,515
(Nov. 20, 1958)) (emphasis added).
90. Id. (citing H.R. 7902, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. 2755, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934)).

91. Id. (citing Comment, TribalSelf-Government and the IndianReorganization
Act of 1934, 70 MIcH. L. REv. 955, 962 (1972)).
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realities of Indian problems. The Senate Report on the redrafted
bill "distinguished the purposes of stabilization of tribal governmental organization and modernization of tribal economic activities
through the corporate structure."2
Finally, after reviewing what it termed the "paucity of decisional authority" on the matter,93 which it later dismissed as being
either not persuasive or distinguishable from the instant case,94 the
Atkinson court concluded that a construction that recognized two
entities would accord with "sound public policy."95 Otherwise, the
court explained, strict immunity application would inhibit tribal
economic growth in the business world.95

Recognition of two

entities would place the assets of the corporation at risk, "[y]et some
of the tribal property could be kept in reserve, safe from a judgment
execution which could destroy the tribe's livelihood, in recognition
of the special status of the Indian Tribe."'
While Justice Rabinowitz's opinion in Atkinson provided
clarification of legislation that had existed for more than forty years,
it did not fully address several troubling questions regarding the
separate nature of the entities. Because the alleged negligence
involved only the section 16 governmental entity, sovereign
immunity protected the community's assets from judgment. The
court did not consider the corporate charter's "sue and be sued"
clause 98 to constitute a waiver with respect to the governmental
activities that were the subject of the suit.99 Thus, no tribal assets

were subject to judgment."

But had the action been applicable

92. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)). This revision of
the initial IRA legislation to allow for two entities, one of which would be able to
obtain credit, has also received attention from other Indian Law commentators. See
COHEN, supra note 18, at 325-26.
93. Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 173.
94. Id. at 175 n.83.
95. Id. at 174.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 175.
98. Tribes electing to form a § 17 corporate organization receive a Bureau of
Indian Affairs drafted charter, which often contains these clauses that allow the
corporation to sue and be sued. COHEN, supra note 18, at 326.
99. Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 175.
100. There is a split among the courts as to whether a "sue and be sued"
provision in the § 17 entity's charter constitutes a waiver of tribal (i.e., governmental) immunity. Several courts have found that such a provision is an authorized
waiver of tribal immunity. See, e.g., Fontenelle v. Omaha Tribe, 430 F.2d 143, 147
(8th Cir. 1970); Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 374 P.2d 691, 694 (Colo. 1962).
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to the section 17 corporate entity, how far would the waiver have
reached? How would a court distinguish corporate holdings from
"tribal property [that] could be kept in reserve, safe from a
judgment execution which could destroy the tribe's livelihood"?"0 '
Some commentators have opined that assets remain the
property of the section 16 entity until the tribe transfers them to the
section 17 corporation.'0 2 In a recent opinion, the Alaska Supreme Court clearly adopted this position."° Also, the Atkinson
court apparently took this view as it approvingly quoted a Department of the Interior Solicitor Opinion that states:
"If [the asset in question] has not been effectively transferred or
conveyed to the tribal corporation, it is not a corporate asset,
and remains the property of the constitutional organization of
the tribe.... Ordinarily it is safe to assume that a transaction
of a so-called 'organized tribe' is a transaction of the tribal
municipal corporation, which may have as broad or broader
economic powers as its business corporation counterpart. Unless
documentary evidence such as a conveyance to the business
corporationor contractualagreement,by resolution or otherwise,
gives the business corporationan agency or proprietaryrelationship to certainproperty,it can be assumed that the corporation is

not directly involved. Where the property or funds involved are
created by the tribal corporation then transactions involving such
resources are governed by the provisions of the charter. Since
many constitutions and charters incorporate by reference the
provisions of each other, the appropriate power is often similar
for both legal entities." 1"
This Solicitor's opinion seems to serve as a portion of the basis for
the Atkinson court's belief that a portion of the tribal assets could
remain protected from a judgment execution, in recognition of the
tribe's special fragile financial status.0 5

Others, like Atkinson, have held that the waiver applied only to economic dealings
for which the corporation was formed. See Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian Communi-

ty, 455 F. Supp 462, 463-64 (D. Mont. 1978); cf. Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla

Indian Community, 451 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (D. Alaska 1978) (stating that if the
enterprise had clearly been operated by a § 17 entity only, a "sue and be sued"

clause would not affect the § 16 entity's sovereign immunity).
101. Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 175.
102. CoHEN, supra note 18, at 326.
103. Hydaburg Coop. Ass'n v. Hydaburg Fisheries, 826 P.2d 751 (Alaska 1992).
See infra text accompanying notes 169-173.
104. Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 171-72 (quoting Opinions of the Solicitor, Dep't of
the Interior, No. M-36,545 (Dec. 16, 1958)) (emphasis added).

105. Id.at 175.
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One federal court drawing upon the Atkinson opinion specifically noted and emphasized that an earlier, non-quoted portion of
the same Solicitor's opinion stated that whether the section 16 or 17
entity held the assets in question "is determined by the facts of each
case."'" With some frustration, that court noted that in the case
before it, the loss of many corporate and governmental documents
and the confusion of the defendant as to the distinction between the
two entities raised "considerable doubt" as to ownership of the
assets at issue.'0 7 Still other federal cases have caused commentators to observe that "[c]omplications in determining the waiver can
arise from the fact that many tribes have not clearly separated the
activities of their section 16 tribal governments from the section 17
business corporations."'"
IV. THE DIVISION BETWEEN THE COURTS

A. United States v. Oregon: The Basis for the Division
The division between the Ninth Circuit and the Alaska
Supreme Court over the waiver of sovereign immunity in the
contractual context had its genesis in the 1981 Ninth Circuit case of
United States v. Oregon,"° in which the court confronted the issue
of whether the Yakima Indian Tribe had consented to suit.
In Oregon, the Yakima Tribe and the State of Washington had
both intervened in a proceeding that centered on a conservation

106. Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Community, 451 F. Supp. 1127,
1135 (D. Alaska 1978) (quoting Opinions of the Solicitor, Dep't of the Interior, No.

M-36,545 (Dec. 16, 1958)).
107. Id. The court also noted that the roles of the plaintiff and the defendant

were reversed from the ones usually encountered in corporate law. Normally, the
plaintiff seeks to show confusion and intermingling of assets in order to "pierce the

corporate veil," while the defendant would be attempting to demonstrate that all
activities were corporate. See generally Philip R. Strauss, Note, Control and/or

Misconduct" Clarifying the Test for Piercing the Corporate Veil in Alaska, 9
ALASKA L. REv. 65 (1992) (for general discussion on piercing the corporate veil
in Alaska). In this case, the defendant tribe desired to show intermingling, since
assets found to belong to the § 16 governmental entity would be protected by

sovereign immunity, while § 17 corporate assets would be available for judgment
due to a "sue and be sued" clause in the corporate charter. ParkerDrilling,415 F.

Supp. at 1134 n.14.
108. COHEN, supra note 18, at 326 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411

U.S. 145, 157 n.13 (1973)).
109. 657 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1981).
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decree governing Indian fishing rights." ° Both of these intervenors had applied successfully to the district court for modification of
the compact."' Still later, the original parties and the intervenors
signed a five-year conservation agreement. 12 The new agreement
explicitly stated that during the plan's life, any dispute incapable of
negotiated resolution would be submitted to the federal court."'
When a disagreement eventually arose, the State of Washington
successfully sought an injunction in the district court, per the
agreement's terms, against the Yakimas' fishing." 4 The tribe
and alleged, among other claims, that it was immune from
appealed
115
suit.
United States Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, then
a member of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, wrote the majority
opinion in Oregon, which held that the Tribe could waive its own
immunity 16 and, in fact, that it had effectively done so." 7 The
court based its conclusion on two premises, both of which it termed
"sound": that the tribal intervention and the later agreement to
submit all disputes to the Oregon district court each amounted to
consent to suit." 8 With regard to the intervention, the court noted
that the tribe had initially entered the proceedings to guard its
fishing rights."9 If the original decree had found the contract's
specified fish species in peril, the tribe could not have obtained
immunity from the injunction' 2° The court reasoned:
Otherwise, tribal immunity might be transformed into a rule that
tribes may never lose a lawsuit. ... By seeking equity, this
Tribe assumed the risk that any equitable judgment secured
could be modified if warranted by changed circumstances ...
and that the Tribe itself would be bound by an order it deemed
adverse.'
In support of its holding, the court also provided a brief two
paragraph passage that cited the language of the later conservation

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id at
Id
Id.
Id.
Id. at

1011.
1016.
1011-12.
1012.
1013.
1014.

1014-15.

TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

1993]

agreement, which stated that "'[i]n the event that significant
management problems arise from this agreement that cannot be
resolved by mutual agreement, the parties agree to submit the issues
to federal court for determination. In any event, the Court shall
retain jurisdiction over the case of U.S. v. Oregon ... ,,,12The
Ninth Circuit deemed the dispute to be the type of disagreement
envisioned at the time the parties signed the contract.12 Without
further elaboration, the Court summarily stated that "[c]onsequently, the Tribe
may not at this stage renege on its earlier agree4
ment.

B.

, 12

Native Village of Eyak v. GC Contractors: The Alaska
Supreme Court Extends Oregon

Two years later, the Alaska Supreme Court, in citing Oregon,
embarked on a departure from the requirement that a tribal waiver
of sovereign immunity requires "unequivocal expression." Native
Village of Eyak v. GC Contractors' involved a suit by a contractor to enforce payments due under an agreement for the construction of a community center. The building contract included an
arbitration clause that provided:
"[Certain disputes relating to a breach of contract] shall be
decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction
Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association then obtaining unless the parties mutually agree
otherwise .... The foregoing agreement to arbitrate and any
other agreement to arbitrate with an additional person or
persons duly consented to by the parties to the Owner Contractor Agreement shall be specifically enforceable under the
prevailing arbitration law. The award rendered by the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be entered upon it in
accordance with applicable law in any court having jurisdiction
thereof , ,"
Upon completion of the facility, the Village maintained that it did
not owe the full amount the contractor asserted. The parties
ultimately submitted the dispute to arbitration, where the contractor
received an award of approximately $13,750.127 Eyak refused to

122. IL at 1016 (quoting agreement between Yakima Tribe, United States, State
of Oregon and State of Washington).
123. 1&
124. Id.
125. 658 P.2d 756 (Alaska 1983).

126. Id. at 758 (quoting contract's arbitration clause).
127. Id.at 757.
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pay, contending that it was immune from suit. The superior court
rejected this assertion, ruling that Eyak had failed to establish its
status as an "Indian tribe."'" Upon appeal, the Eyak court found
it unnecessary to decide whether the Village constituted an "Indian
tribe" entitled to immunity, because even if it were, the group had
waived that immunity by way of agreement to an arbitration
clause. 9
The Village contended that the arbitration clause lacked enough
specificity to constitute an effective waiver, because "a waiver of
sovereign immunity ""cannot be implied but must be unequivocally
expressed.'""'' 30 The supreme court flatly rejected this argument.' Specifically, the court reasoned that arbitration could not
resolve any contractual dispute if one of the parties intended to
assert the sovereign immunity defense. In citing cases from other
states, the Eyak court held that "[t]o the extent possible, all
provisions in a contract should be found meaningful" and that the
arbitration clause would be meaningless if it did not constitute a
waiver of any existing Eyak immunity."' Therefore, inclusion of
the arbitration clause in the agreement had to constitute a tribal
waiver of immunity. By resorting to principles of contract law to
yield a construction that indicated a waiver, however, the Alaska
Supreme Court essentially found the waiver by implication. Such a
process does not comport with the unequivocal expression that the
United States Supreme Court demands before an effective waiver
of sovereign immunity can be established.
The court followed this discussion with a separate rationale for
why a waiver was present. The agreement at issue specified that
judgment could be entered on the arbitration result "'in accordance
133
with applicable law in any court having jurisdiction thereof.'
The supreme court read this language to further evince the Village's
consent to waive its immunity. However, the court, in finding an
effective waiver, overlooked the fact that "applicable law" would
necessarily embrace the well-established doctrine of tribal sovereign

128. Id.
129. Id. at 761.
130. Id at 760 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)
(quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United States
v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)))).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Ie at 760-61 (quoting contract's arbitration clause).
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immunity. Therefore, "applicable law" would insulate a sovereign
entity from judgment.
For the Native entity to prevail, it is not even necessary to find
this argument fully persuasive, but merely plausible. If the alternate
view suggested has merit, the agreement term can be deemed
"ambiguous."'" According to the Ninth Circuit, in Indian law all
ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the tribes 3 -a position
the Alaska Supreme Court now accepts as "settled principle."'3
The result would be a finding that given the two meritorious
interpretations of the agreement, the one that must be accepted is
the view that preserves the protection afforded by sovereign
immunity.
C. Pan American Co. v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians: The
Ninth Circuit Responds
The Ninth Circuit's view of this treatment of both established
Indian law doctrine and its Oregonreasoning became evident in Pan
American Co. v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians.37 Pan American also involved an arbitration clause, but in a very different
context. The case concerned the tribal government's enactment of
an ordinance that imposed licensure and work permit requirements
on reservation bingo game operators. Pan American alleged that
the ordinance, which levied an $80,000 expense on the company,
amounted to a breach of an existing agreement that authorized the
entity to conduct bingo games on the reservation. 3 ' This agreement included a clause that provided:
"[In] the event a dispute arises between its parties ... either

party may seek arbitration of said dispute and both parties do
hereby subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the American
134. "Ambiguity" (or "ambiguous") is defined as "[d]uplicity, indistinctness, or
uncertainty of meaning of an expression used in a written instrument....
Ambiguity exists if reasonable persons can find different meanings in a statute,
document, etc., [or] when good arguments can be made for either of two contrary
positions as to a meaning of a term in a document." BLACK'S LAW DICnoNARY
79-80 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
135. Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Community, 451 F. Supp. 1127,
1140 (D. Alaska 1978) (citing Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532
F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 1975)).
136. Hydaburg Coop. Ass'n v. Hydaburg Fisheries, 826 P.2d 751, 757 n.10
(Alaska 1992) (citing Santa Rosa, 532 F.2d at 660); In re City of Nome, 780 P.2d
363, 367 (Alaska 1989) (citing ParkerDrilling,451 F. Supp at 1140).
137. 884 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1989).

138. Id.
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Arbitration Association and do agree to be bound by and
comply with
its rules and regulations as promulgated from time
139
to time."1
Pursuant to this provision, Pan American submitted the dispute
to arbitration. When the arbitrator dismissed the claims as nonarbitrable, Pan American sought relief from the federal district
court. The district court dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction
because the Band had not "'expressly waived its sovereign immunity
to uncontested suit.""'
Pan American ultimately appealed the
decision to the Ninth Circuit, alleging, inter alia, that the arbitration
clause constituted an explicit waiver of the Band's sovereign
immunity.
Despite Pan American's claim that the clause "would otherwise
'merely be a trap for the unsuspecting' and leave [the company]
without judicially enforceable remedies for the Band's alleged
breach of contract,', 141 the Ninth Circuit refused to imply a waiver
of sovereign immunity. In reaffirming the principle that tribal
consent to suit must be unequivocally expressed, the court reasoned
that "Indian sovereignty... is not a discretionary principle subject
to the vagaries of the commercial bargaining process or equities of
a given situation."'4"
The court immediately followed with what seems to be a
strongly worded response to the Alaska Supreme Court's treatment
of Oregon. In relying upon the United States Supreme Court's
statement in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 4' that "[ilt is settled
that a waiver of sovereign immunity 'cannot be implied but must
be unequivocally expressed[,]""' "44 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
"[c]onsent by implication, whatever its justification, still offends the
clear mandate of Santa ClaraPueblo. Our decision in United States
v. Oregon... in no way lessens the fundamental principle that tribal
sovereign immunity remains intact unless surrendered in express and
unequivocal terms."' 45 In what could be viewed as criticism of the

139. M. at 419 (quoting agreement between Sycuan Band and Pan American

Co.).
140. Id. at 417 (quoting district court order).
141. Id. at 419.
142. Id. (citing United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S.

506, 513 (1940)).
143. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
144. Id. at 58 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392,399 (1976) (quoting
United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969))).
145. Pan Am. Co., 884 F.2d at 419 (citations omitted).
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Alaska Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit specifically noted that
Eyak had relied on Oregon in interpreting contractual arbitration
provisions as immunity waivers. 46 However, while the Ninth
Circuit offered no further specific comment,147 the opinion continued by distinguishing Oregon from Pan American on the grounds
that in the former case, the tribe had "explicitly agreed to be bound
by whatever resolution ordered by the district court."'
In a similar spirit, the Pan American court also emphasized that
"the [Oregon] conservation agreement occurred... in the context
of an ongoing legal dispute in which the tribe had already submitted
to the jurisdiction of the district court-as an intervening party
subject to the ongoing enforcement of the district court's original
decree-before becoming a signatory to the agreement.' ' 49 The
court finally underscored the restricted reach of its earlier opinion
by stating that "Oregon's finding of waiver probably tests the outer
limits50of Santa Clara Pueblo's admonition against implied waiv1
ers."'
D. Hydaburg CooperativeAss'n v. HydaburgFisheries: Eyak's
Affirmation
Despite the Ninth Circuit's Pan American opinion, in 1992 the
Alaska Supreme Court again looked to the meaningful contractual
provision rationale in deciding Hydaburg Cooperative Ass'n v.
Hydaburg Fisheries.'
The Hydaburg agreement contained a
clause providing that if any dispute arose, "'the matter shall be
settled in accordance with the Uniform Arbitration Act of the State
of Alaska.""' 52 When the parties to the agreement ultimately

146. Id
147. Id The court noted that two state courts had relied on Oregon in
interpreting contractual arbitration clauses as sovereign immunity waivers. In
addition to Eyak, the court cited Val/Del, Inc. v. Superior Court. Id. (citing
Val/Del, Inc. v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 502 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 920 (1985)). The Val/Del court explicitly agreed with the Eyak reasoning;
it quoted from the portion of the Eyak opinion citing Oregon and indicating that
all contractual provisions should be found meaningful. Val/Del, 703 P.2d at 508-09
(citing Native Village of Eyak v. GC Contractors, 658 P.2d 756,760 (Alaska 1983)).
148. Pan Am. Co., 884 F.2d at 420 (emphasis added).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 826 P.2d 751 (Alaska 1992).
152. Id. at 752 (quoting agreement between Hydaburg Cooperative Association
and Hydaburg Fisheries).
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came into conflict, Hydaburg Fisheries sued the Native Association
for, among other things, violation of the Alaska Partnership Act and
breach of contract." In response, the Native Association successThe arbitrators
fully moved the court to order arbitration.'
levied an award of over $200,000 against the Native Association,
which subsequently asserted a sovereign immunity defense in
refusing to pay. 55 On appeal, after concluding that the Association had not offered evidence of tribal status and entitlement to
sovereign immunity,"6 the Hydaburg court enforced the award
and concluded that even assuming sovereign immunity applied, it
had been waived by the arbitration clause. 7 In doing so, the
court relied on Eyak's holding that a "contractual agreement to
arbitrate waives any immunity from suit."'58 However, the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Pan American made it necessary for the
Hydaburg court to distinguish the situation it faced from the facts
of that case.
Despite the Ninth Circuit's admonition in Pan American, the
Alaska Supreme Court differentiated the disputes by noting that
Pan American did not involve a suit to compel arbitration or
enforce an arbitration award, but instead represented a direct attack
on the tribe's authority to regulate affairs on its reservation.5 9
Ultimately, the court opined that "[a]rguably, even under Pan
American an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising out of a
contract constitutes a tribe's consent to suit for the limited purposes

153. Id, at 753.
154. Id.
155. Id
156. The court specifically stated that Village reorganization under § 16 of the
IRA alone was not adequate to establish tribal status for purposes concerning the
sovereign immunity doctrine. Id at 754.
157. 1&
158. Ia (citing Native Village of Eyak v. GC Contractors, 658 P.2d 756, 760
(Alaska 1983)). The court also reasoned that principles of international law held
that in an action to compel arbitration, an agreement to arbitrate is a waiver of
immunity. While recognizing that federal courts have held that Indian tribes are
not foreign states, the court summarily stated, citing no support, that "[n]evertheless
the rationale of cases relating to the waiver of immunity by foreign sovereigns is
equally applicable... [to] Indian tribes." Id. at 754-55. Chief Justice Rabinowitz
characterized this reliance on international law as "misplaced" and "inapplicable"
in the tribal sovereign immunity context because sovereign powers of Indian nations
have long been differentiated from those of other sovereign nations. Id. at 759
(Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also supra note 34.
159. Hydaburg, 826 P.2d at 754.
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of compelling arbitration or enforcing an arbitration award."'6
The Hydaburg court further attempted to distinguish the facts of the
instant case from Pan American through the specific provisions of
the arbitration clauses. The Pan American clause gave jurisdiction
to the American Arbitration Association, while the Hydaburg
agreement looked to settlement in accordance with the Uniform
Arbitration Act of the State of Alaska. The Alaska Supreme Court
noted that, among other provisions, the Act gave the state superior
court jurisdiction to order arbitration and enter judgment on its
resulting awards. 6'
These differences, while accurate, do not suffice to constitute a
waiver of sovereign immunity in the federal courts. In Pan
American, the Ninth Circuit specifically emphasized the longstanding principle that a waiver of sovereign immunity must have
clear and unequivocal expression. The added warning that Indian
sovereignty should not fall "subject to the vagaries of the commercial bargaining process or equities of a given situation"'62 further
underscores the stringent standard of this court. In discussing
Oregon, the Ninth Circuit found it worth repeating that the Tribe
had "explicitly agreed to be bound by whatever resolution ordered
by the district court."'"
The fact that the parties had agreed to resort to Alaska's
Uniform Arbitration Act does not "unequivocally" indicate the
Native Association had "expressly" intended to relinquish sovereign

160. Id.
161. Id. at 755 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.43-170 (1992)). The Hydaburgcourt
also found a waiver of sovereign immunity by reasoning that in this case, unlike
Pan American, the Native Association itself actively sought arbitration. Id. This
reasoning seems to be compatible with a portion of the Ninth Circuit's rationale in
Oregon. In Oregon, in addition to finding a waiver in the text of the conservation
agreement, the Ninth Circuit held that the tribe had waived sovereign immunity by
intervening in a proceeding already before the district court. United States v.
Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 1981). A later Ninth Circuit opinion verified
the separate identity of the two rationales and stated that Oregon "must be viewed
as establishing that Indian tribes may, in certain circumstances, consent to suit by
participation in litigation." McClendon v. United States, 885 F.2d 627, 630-31 n.2
(9th Cir. 1989).
162. Pan Am. Co. v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians, 884 F.2d 416,419 (9th Cir.
1989) (citing United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506,513

(1940)).
163. Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
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immunity 64 under the Ninth Circuit's rigorous requirement. The
Association's waiver can be found only through reference to one of
many provisions in the Act, and not through the express acquiescence in the agreement to the jurisdiction of a court.
Once more, if this argument has even a minimal degree of
The Alaska
merit, the agreement's terms are "ambiguous."
Supreme Court has held that all ambiguities must be resolved in
favor of the Indians.16 Therefore, in Hydaburg, the Alaska
Supreme Court ignores the Ninth Circuit's warning against implying
a waiver 66through "the vagaries of the commercial bargaining
process.'
One member of the Hydaburg court acknowledged that the
majority's rationale might exceed the "outer limits" of Santa Clara
Pueblo as described in Pan American. In his dissenting and
concurring opinion,167 Chief Justice Rabinowitz deemed the court's
discussion of contractual arbitration provisions "superfluous." He
noted that Pan American had rejected the idea that contractual
arbitration provisions constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity, and
also that the Ninth Circuit had deliberately corrected the "misconception that Oregon supported such a result.""l
Hydaburg's influence on the ramifications of the sovereign
immunity doctrine in Alaska, however, did not end with its
disposition of the contractual arbitration provision's effect. Because
the Native Association organized both IRA section 16 and section
17 entities, the court was required to delineate between the
corporate assets subject to judgment and judgment-proof tribal
funds. The court held that deciding which entity owns the assets is

164. This position was taken by Chief Justice Rabinowitz in his concurring and
dissenting opinion in Hydaburg. Hydaburg,826 P.2d at 758-59 (Rabinowitz, C.J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
165. In re City of Nome, 780 P.2d 363, 367 (Alaska 1989); Parker Drilling Co.
v. Metlakatla Indian Community, 451 F. Supp. 1127, 1140 (D. Alaska 1978) (citing
Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 1975)).
166. See Pan Am. Co., 884 F.2d at 419 (citing United States v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 513 (1940)).
167. Chief Justice Rabinowitz agreed with the portion of the majority opinion
that held that the Native group, by requesting the superior court to order
arbitration, had consented to the court's jurisdiction and waived its immunity.
Hydaburg,826 P.2d at 758 (citing Washington v. Confederated Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979)) (Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
168. Id. at 758-59 (Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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a factual issue, with the burden of proof resting upon the Native
group. Among other arguments to support this point,'6 9 the court
noted that debtors who claim exemptions from judgment bear the
burden of proof.70 In taking this position, the Hydaburg court
claimed it was not rejecting the Atkinson position 7 ' that the
governmental unit owns the assets of the Native group.Y

The

majority also asserted that this rationale operated consistently with
the accepted rule of Indian law that all ambiguities must be resolved
in favor of the Indians."
In reconciling these basic tenets of
Indian law with their holding, the majority simply stated, with no
authoritative support, that "[tihe normal presumption in favor of a
Native group is inapplicable when such group is claiming an
exemption from debt."' 74
Chief Justice Rabinowitz, the author of the Atkinson opinion,
took exception to this rationale. He asserted his belief that assets
are presumed exempt from execution "unless specifically conveyed
or set aside to the section 17 corporation" and that such conveyance
or segregation must be affirmatively shown. 75
E. Nenana Fuel Co. v. Native Village of Venetie
Later in 1992, the Alaska Supreme Court again found a waiver
of sovereign immunity through a contractual provision. In Nenana
Fuel Co. v. Native Village of Venetiey6 the plaintiff brought a
breach of contract action, alleging that the Native entity had refused
to make payment for goods delivered under an agreement between
the two parties. The Nenana Fuel court held that a Remedies on
Default clause constituted an express waiver of the Village's
sovereign immunity. The clause provided:

169. Id.at 757. The court also claimed that this treatment was consistent with
the "rule that a Native entity asserting sovereign immunity bears the burden of

proving it is a tribe." L (citing Board of Ketchikan v. Alaska Native Bhd. &
Sisterhood, No. 14,666 P.2d 1015,1023 (Alaska 1983) (Rabinowitz, J., concurring)).
The court further noted the policy of placing the burden on the party who controls
the evidence. Id (citing Sloan v. Jefferson, 758 P.2d 81, 83 (Alaska 1988)).

170. Md
171. This discussion addresses some of the uncertainty remaining after Atkinson.
See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
172. Hydaburg, 826 P.2d at 757 n.10.
173. Id
174. Id
175. Id at 759-60 (Rabinowitz, CJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
176. 834 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1992).
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"On the occurrence of a default and after any notice required
... and in addition to any remedies described in the Note,
[Nenana Fuel] ... may:
(a) bring an action upon the Note;
(d) dispose of the collateral in any commercially reasonable
manner and, in the event of a deficiency, bring an action against
Debtors for that deficiency;
(f) invoke any other remedy provided by law or this agreement;
and
(g) invoke any
combination of these remedies allowable under
1
Alaska law." 7

In reviewing this language, the court cited Eyak's holding that
a "tribe waives its sovereign immunity by agreeing to contract terms
inconsistent with sovereign immunity."' 78 Again, the Alaska
Supreme Court distinguished Eyak from Pan American on the basis
that the latter did not involve a suit to compel arbitration or to
enforce an arbitration award. 79 Once more, the court proffered
that "'[a]rguably, even under Pan American an agreement to
arbitrate disputes arising out of a contract constitutes a tribe's
consent to suit. '"" '

Ultimately, the Nenana Fuel court read "the

Remedies on Default clause as expressly waiving any sovereign
immunity which Venetie might possess, and referring actions based
'
upon the contract to the Alaska courts for application of Alaska law."181
177. Id. at 1232 (quoting agreement between Native Village of Venetie and
Nenana Fuel Co.) (omissions in original).
178. Id. (citing Native Village of Eyak v. GC Contractors, 658 P.2d 756 (Alaska
1983)).
179. Id. at 1233.
180. Id (quoting Hydaburg Coop. Ass'n v. Hydaburg Fisheries, 826 P.2d 751,
754 (Alaska 1992)). The court also noted the Hydaburg opinion's comparison of
tribes to foreign sovereigns. Id.; see supra note 158.
181. Nenana Fuel Co., 834 P.2d at 1233. The Village had organized both governmental and corporate entities under § 16 and § 17 of the IRA, respectively. Each
had signed the agreement at issue. Id. at 1230. Because the court found the
Remedies on Default clause to be a waiver of sovereign immunity, the majority did
not consider it necessary to determine if the Village constituted a sovereign, or to
consider the nature and effect of a "sue and be sued" clause in the § 17 corporate
charter. Id. at 1233. Chief Justice Rabinowitz again dissented. After finding
Venetie was entitled to sovereign status, id. at 1245 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting),
the Chief Justice stated that the Remedies on Default clause did not constitute an
express waiver of sovereign immunity. Therefore, no waiver was present for the
§ 16 entity. Id. at 1249 (Rabinowitz, CJ., dissenting). Additionally, he would have
deferred to the tribal forum for determination of the extent and effect of waiver

1993]

TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

393

Because the Nenana Fuel opinion relied almost exclusively on
the Hydaburg logic, it remains subject to the same flaws analyzed
above." The clause made no reference to any specific court to
which the Native group would submit itself to jurisdiction.
Assuming that an Alaskan Native entity is entitled to the protection
of sovereign immunity, then Alaska law, as referenced in the
agreement, would not permit assertion of a claim against the group
absent an express waiver. Again, all that is required for the Native
entity to prevail is that this argument be plausible and, accordingly,
the agreement be deemed ambiguous. As all ambiguities must be
resolved in favor of the Indians, this Alaska Supreme Court decision
joins Eyak and Hydaburg in exceeding the "outer limits" of Santa
ClaraPueblo.
V. LEGAL CONCLUSIONS

Commentators have observed a recent general trend in courts
away from applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity to governmental entities."
Nevertheless, a counter-trend runs against
finding a waiver of a government's sovereign immunity through
implication.Y
Commentators have declared that "[i]t is clear
from an examination of state laws that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is far from dead, although to a considerable degree it 1is
now being retranslated as a 'discretionary function' immunity."'
That is, sovereign immunity is enjoyed at the pleasure of the holder.
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court held that a statutory
waiver of a state's immunity must be "exercised with unmistakable
clarity" by Congress in order to be effective. 6 Likewise, in the
Native law context, the Court has held that a statutory waiver of

upon the § 17 entity. Id. at 1249-51 (Rabinowitz, CJ., dissenting).
182. See supra notes 162-168 and accompanying text. Additionally, in Nenana
Fuel, there was no affirmative act (e.g., consenting to a court's jurisdiction) that
accompanied the alleged textual waiver, as there had been in Hydaburg,826 P.2d

at 755, and United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 1981).
183. See, e.g., KEETON et al., supra note 33, § 131, at 1055.
184. "[Tlhere is a recent line of cases that hold a waiver of sovereign immunity
must be expressed unequivocally." 14 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3655, at 37 (West Supp. 1993).
185. Ralph W. Johnson & James M. Madden, Sovereign Immunity in Indian

Tribal Law, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 153, 188 (1984) (footnote omitted).
186. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 2584 (1991).
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tribal sovereign immunity ""'cannot be implied but must be
unequivocally expressed. '' ' ' ' ..
The doctrine of sovereign immunity arose, in part, from the
legal fiction that "the King can do no wrong." But over the years,
the doctrine also came to be applied as a matter of policy, to protect
the public fisc. In Native law, the doctrine serves a similar purpose:
to guard a largely non-replenishable asset base from rapid erosion.
Unlike the federal and state governments, Native groups cannot
simply refill coffers for community expenditures by increasing taxes;
often individual Natives are too impoverished to act as a source of
additional revenue."s Furthermore, in addition to their ability to
spread losses better, larger governments also are more capable of
foreseeing and preventing losses through enhanced in-depth
planning-an advantage that Native groups frequently do not
enjoy. 9 Quite simply, the sovereign immunity "doctrine prevents
seriously impair or destroy [Native]
burdensome losses that could
1
90
operations.
governmental
In passing the IRA, Congress recognized the need to mitigate
the effects of sovereign immunity to allow Native entities to
compete effectively in the commercial arena.' 9 ' Nevertheless,
Congress elected not to eliminate the doctrine entirely. In the past
five years, Congress has amended both section 16" 2 and section
17 3 of the IRA, but has not chosen to modify the doctrine of
tribal sovereign immunity as developed and applied by the courts
since the IRA's enactment. The United States Supreme Court in
1991 refused "to modify the long-established principle of tribal
sovereign immunity"'94 and recognized:
Congress has always been at liberty to dispense with such tribal
immunity or limit it. ... Instead, Congress has consistently

187. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (quoting United
States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S.
1, 4 (1969))).
188. Johnson & Madden, supra note 185, at 171.
189. Id at 190.
190. Id at 171.
191. See text accompanying supra notes 68-73 and 85-97.
192. Act of Nov. 1, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-581, tit. I, § 101, 102 Stat. 2938
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1988)).
193. Act of May 24, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-301, § 3(c), 104 Stat. 207 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 477 (Supp. III 1991)).
194. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S.
505, 510 (1991).
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reiterated its approval of the immunity doctrine. [A number of
legislative] Acts reflect Congress' desire to promote the "goal of
Indian self-government, including its 'overriding goal' of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development." 95
For the same reasons that courts have applied the doctrine in
the past to young or fragile governments on the basis of policy
considerations, sovereign immunity in the Native law context acts as
a protective device that promotes policy goals. While application of
the doctrine may occasionally lead to results that seem unfair, it
does serve purposes that, in the view of Congress, "override" other
policy concerns, such as potentially detrimental effects of unenforceable arbitration clauses.
Furthermore, it is far from clear that such unenforceable
contract provisions result in unfair outcomes, even in business
dealings. In a leading case on the application of tribal sovereign
immunity, the Eighth Circuit held that especially "in such [commercial] enterprises and transactions[,]... the Indian tribes and Indians
need protection. The history of intercourse between the Indian
tribes and Indians with whites demonstrates such need."'9 6 The
Ninth Circuit has recognized that "'[t]ribes and persons dealing with
them long have known how to waive sovereign immunity when they
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit has reasoned that,
so wish.""'
"[g]iven that the courts have consistently required express and
unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity," if a party doing
business with the Native group desires such a waiver, he should
negotiate to obtain a sufficiently specific provision. 8 Otherwise,
"considerations of equity are not in [his] favor."' 99 In a similar
vein, one commentator argues that, due to the well-established
status of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, "if a non-Indian
business knowingly enters into a contract without a waiver, the court
should determine that 2the business has deemed the particular
venture worth the risk.' 00

195. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987)).
196. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 517, 521 (8th Cir.
1966).
197. McClendon v. United States, 885 F.2d 627,631 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Am.
Indian Agric. Credit Consortium v. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374,1379
(8th Cir. 1985)) (alteration in original).
198. Id. at 632.

199. Id.
200. Recent Case, 102 HARV. L. REv. 533, 561-62 n.43 (1988). In fact, Native
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Indeed, a Native group can "bargain away" sovereign immunity
both institutionally and through specific transactions. One commentator observes that by permitting a Native group organized under
section 17 of the IRA to waive immunity for corporate dealings,
Congress has created a market mechanism for parties to deal with
tribal sovereign immunity.2°1 The tribe can easily remove the
doctrine's protective barrier in business transactions through the
inclusion of a "sue and be sued" clause in the corporate charter.
Tribes have an economic incentive to take such an action, as it will
make them a more attractive entity for business relationships.2"
Similarly, a tribe may waive sovereign immunity with respect to an
individual transaction through the agreement's terms. Since the
parties may modify the negotiated terms to reflect the existence and
scope of the doctrine's waiver, the doctrine provides Native groups
with a bargaining chip that they can surrender in exchange for other
Finally, if the Native group does not
valuable consideration.'
waive sovereign immunity, the doctrine will provide the tribe with
greater negotiating strength should the disagreement be submitted
to alternative dispute resolution forums. 2 4 These perspectives
treat sovereign immunity like most other variables of a business
transaction: it is simply open to negotiation.
Professors Prosser and Keeton note that "[t]he reasons of policy
given in support of any particular immunity are apt to be grounded
in values and perceptions of the times, and with the change in
values and perceptions, the immunity itself is likely to undergo
change as well."' 5 Recently, both the Congress, the body with
plenary authority over Indian matters, subject to constitutional
limits,' and the United States Supreme Court have declined to
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in the commercial context.
Thereby, Congress seems to have made, as confirmed by the
groups offer unique advantages as business partners. Most important among these
benefits is the fact that Native groups often control scarce resources. They also
may offer "technical assistance, tax advantages, abundant labor [and] a nonunionized workplace." Frank Pommersheim, Economic Development in Indian Country:
What are the Questions?, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 195, 205 (1984).
201. Recent Case, supra note 200, at 560-61.
202. Id.
203. Bruce A. Wagman, Advancing Tribal Sovereign Immunity as a Pathway to
Power,27 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 474 (1993).
204. Id.
205. KEETON et al., supra note 33, § 132, at 1032.
206. COHEN, supra note 18, at 219.
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Supreme Court, the judgment that the position of Native groups in
our society still merits the doctrine's protection. Additionally,
market mechanisms exist that will deal with any perceived inequities
that may result from the protection sovereign immunity provides.
The Alaska Supreme Court, however, has willingly found an
effective waiver in situations where it is not clear that the tribe has
consented to suit. In doing so, the Alaska Supreme Court thus
undermines worthy congressional policy goals and interferes with
market operation by potentially frustrating the contracting parties'
expectations.
VI.

PRACTITIONER CONSIDERATIONS

The distinction between the IRA section 16 and section 17
entities, as discussed in Atkinson, holds lessons for both Native
groups organized under the IRA and the parties that do business
with them. Alaska 7 and federal" courts have both recognized
the distinction between the section 16 governmental unit and the
section 17 corporate organization. However, this line has proven
difficult to draw in practice with regard to the ownership of assets.
Native governments can assist themselves greatly by being
aware of the distinction and clearly delineating the differentiation
in organizational documents. This precaution will assist in preventing the presence of a "sue and be sued" clause in the corporate
charter from exposing assets that the Native group intended for the
use of the governmental entity only. The Atkinson court apparently
envisioned this separation when it commented that "some of the
tribal property could be kept in reserve, safe from a judgment
execution which could destroy the tribe's livelihood.""2 9 Organizations engaging in transactions with Native groups would also be
well-advised to consider these distinctions. Assets that may initially
appear available as security for a transaction may not be as
accessible as they first seem.
For Native groups, avoiding the intermingling of both assets in
day-to-day operations will assist the court in determining which IRA
entity claims ownership of the property being sought in judgment.
Many Alaska communities may have an especially difficult time
207. E.g., Hydaburg Coop. Ass'n v. Hydaburg Fisheries, 826 P.2d 751 (Alaska
1992); Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977).
208. E.g., Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Community, 451 F. Supp.

1127 (D. Alaska 1978).
209. Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 175.
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making the distinction regarding separate operations, because often
the same individuals occupy the leadership positions in both the
governmental and business entities.210 Native groups can assist in
clarifying the nature of the transaction in question and the entity to
which it applies by thoroughly documenting the capacity in which
individuals act.
A Native group may also limit its liability by specifically
pledging enumerated assets, rather than providing a general
sovereign immunity waiver, as security in a business transaction'
Such a practice will also assist non-Native enterprises doing business
with Native entities in avoiding excessive uncertainty and confusion
over exposure to potential loss.
In addition to quantitative restrictions, the Native group may
place qualitative limits on the immunity waiver. These limitations
include restrictions to specified types of actions (e.g., liability for
breaches of contract, but not for torts) 212 or on the type of relief
that may be obtained (e.g., declaratory instead of damages).213
The line of Ninth Circuit and Alaska Supreme Court cases
emanating from Oregon also contain implicit cautionary items for
parties on both sides of transactions involving Native groups.
Because the Alaska Supreme Court has been willing to find an
effective waiver of sovereign immunity when the text of the
contractual agreement did not clearly indicate a waiver, Native
entities must be wary of unintentionally surrendering the protection
of sovereign status through contractual provisions. Particularly with
respect to arbitration clauses, the Native group may need to insert
additional language indicating that sovereign immunity is not
waived, or at least specifying the precise extent to which it is
relinquished.
Conversely, parties doing business with Native entities must
concern themselves with alternative interpretations of these
contractual provisions. If a dispute were to make its way into the
federal courts, the absence of a sufficiently express waiver of
sovereign immunity may result in the court labeling the provision
"ambiguous," with the ambiguity being resolved in favor of the

210. CASE, supra note 59, at 465.

211. CLINTON et al., supra note 7, at 341; Karen L. Swaney, Note, Waiver of
Indian Tribal Sovereign Immunity in the Context of Economic Development, 31

ARIZ. L. REV. 389, 401-02 (1989).
212. See ParkerDrilling,451 F. Supp. at 1137.
213. CLINTON et al., supra note 7, at 341.
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Native party. In Nenana Fuel, counsel for the Village argued that
other tribal contracts had used the express language "waiver of
sovereign immunity," demonstrating that when the tribal government intended a waiver, it knew how to accomplish it.214 Although the argument failed to convince the Alaska Supreme Court,
such an assertion may well persuade the Ninth Circuit.215 Therefore, if a party doing business with a Native group desires the
"waiver of sovereign immunity," those exact words should appear
in the applicable contractual provision. In addition, to ensure
meeting the Ninth Circuit's rigorous standard, any waiver should
also explicitly grant jurisdiction to a specified court.216
Although practitioners need to consider the various subtleties
of dealing with sovereign immunity, they should also be mindful that
these issues remain mere derivatives of the larger question that the
Alaska Supreme Court continues to dodge: do Alaskan Native
groups qualify as sovereign entities? Congress could intervene and
finally declare that Alaskan groups deserve full consideration as
sovereigns. However, Congress has yet to make such an absolute
statement. As it stands, the Alaska Supreme Court's line of cases
displays a disturbing readiness to erode sovereign immunity through
waiver. Full congressional recognition of Native Alaskan sovereignty would give these cases even greater importance, changing them
from a political back door to the dangerous frontlines of precedent.
Armed with such authority, aggressive, sophisticated parties could
launch further damaging attacks on the non-replenishable public
fises of Native Alaskan groups.
Kenton Keller Pettit

214. Appellees/Cross-appellants's Brief at 34-35, Nenana Fuel Co. v. Native
Village of Venetie, 834 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1992) (Nos. S-3709, S-3721).
215. "'[T]ribes and persons dealing with them long have known how to waive
sovereign immunity when they so wish."' McClendon v. United States, 885 F.2d
627, 631 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Am. Indian Agric. Credit Consortium v. Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374, 1379 (8th Cir. 1985)).
216. See Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873
F.2d 1221, 1225 n.11 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux
Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1986)).

